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WHAT IS THE MATTER 
 
Stating in the Wealth of Nations that the desire of bettering our condition is a 
desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, 
and never leaves us till we go to the grave Adam Smith (1973) sent a powerful message 
to future studies on economic development which is that, although undoubtedly a social 
phenomenon, the motivation for development stems from the individual, from the 
intrinsic nature of the human being, and, therefore, cuts across cultures and inspires us 
to believe that there is only one way to lead the good life. According to A. Sen (2004) 
Smith took into account the idea of cultural diversity in his theories but, in spite of the 
corroborated Smith’s knowledge of other cultures, I do not believe that this can change 
much to the conclusion that Smith’s imprint in development theory is universalistic 
rather than even moderately particularistic.  
 
Neo-classical theory, despite sharing the classical rationale, has, on the contrary, 
clearly erased the diversity of social behaviours, because otherwise it wouldn’t have 
been able to improve, as it did, through quantitative formalization (Nohra, 1999). This 
means that neo-classical economics cannot take culture into consideration because 
individuals are supposed to be all alike. In fact individualism as a methodology has to 
ignore culture; otherwise it would have to admit the existence of some entity above the 
individual, with influence upon his decisions. Non-economic factors, therefore, are not 
decisive and they should not be taken much into account in development studies. Of 
course nobody believes this, not even neo-classical economists. Nevertheless, they do 
not traditionally study the economic systems, even third-world economic systems, in the 
context of the overall social system.  
 
Less orthodox views of economic development, on the contrary, incorporate 
research on the interaction of economic and non –economic factors, the latter including, 
amongst others, attitudes towards life, work and authority, patterns of kinship and 
religion, and cultural traditions. According to M. Todaro, increasing national 
production, raising levels of living and promoting widespread employment 
opportunities are all as much function of the values, incentives, attitudes and beliefs 
(…) as they are the direct outcome of the manipulation of strategic economic variables 
such as savings, investment, product and factor prices and foreign exchange rates 
(Todaro, 1994, p13). Although a large palette of scholars shares this interest for the 
interaction of culture and economic development, the leading role given to culture in 
development processes is undoubtedly associated with modernization theories, 
according to which economic development should be preceded, or at least accompanied, 
by cultural change. In G. Myrdal’s Asian Drama cultural factors are at the heart of the 
problem because they can constitute obstacles to modernization, namely certain 
religious beliefs. Breeding pigs is often an ideal supplement to raising crops; therefore, 
the Muslim aversion to pigs, for example, strongly interferes with the efficiency of 
peasant farming in Asia (Myrdal, 1968). Modernization theories have been slightly 
covered by the dust of times, but since the turn of the millennium it seems that we are 
witnessing a rebirth of the cultural determinism which characterized modernization. 
 
The new wind of the Institutionalist approach with a classical and neoclassical 
garment has much contributed to this rebirth. Adam Smith himself, again in the Wealth 
of Nations, states that China seems to have been long stationary, and had probably long 
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ago acquired that full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its 
laws and institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other 
laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate and situation might admit (Smith 
1973). It is not my intention to speculate on what Smith would be willing to include in 
these institutions. Free market, class mobility and openness to foreign goods and 
influences are definitely amongst them, but I do not think that adding what is generally 
considered as culture to the institutions that have influence on the wealth of nations, 
could be taken as highly speculative. In this sense we can sustain that the idea that 
culture can restrain or promote the individual’s natural inclination to seek enrichment 
has a flagrant classical inspiration. This is a step that D. Lal did not hesitate to make 
considering culture as an informal institution constraining human nature, which his 
basically self interest, in other words taking culture as an institution limiting the 
maximization of utility, in the case of consumers, and of profits in the case of producers 
(Lal, 1999). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light over this renewed interest on 
culture and to propose alternative explanations to the connections established between 
culture and the incapacity to reach development, with the confessed motivation of 
contributing to send cultural determinism back to the mist and open the way to pluralist 
modes of development. In order to avoid misunderstandings I should probably state 
what I understand as being culture and economic development. Suffice to say that what 
I mean, here, by economic development is voluntarily narrowed to economic growth, 
although I personally stand for a more wide interpretation of development, and that in 
relation to culture, amongst it’s many definitions (see Ruttan 1988) I will adopt the one 
presented by E. de Kadt, for whom it means the shared knowledge, values, beliefs and 
attitudes transmitted from generation to generation, which are at the foundation of order 
and sense, and which allow the members of a community to behave in a convenient and 
acceptable manner, or at least understandable (De Kadt, 1999, p 149). 
 
 
DOES CULTURE MATTER 
 
In one of his most famous writings W.W. Rostow stated that capital formation, 
taken as being at the source of economic growth and, thus, of development, is not just a 
question of maximizing profit, it’s an attitude (Rostow, 1960). The issue, then, is to 
discover what the right attitude is. In the beginning of the twentieth century Max 
Weber’s works on the Protestant ethics (Weber, 1958) led several scholars to believe 
that this could embody that attitude. Honesty, effort, renunciation of pleasure, 
willingness to save and spirit of enterprise, was the sort of attitude that could explain 
why development could not have started elsewhere than in those regions of Europe 
where the Protestant branch of Christianity was dominant. Actually, Weber himself said 
that he didn’t want to demonstrate anything of the kind, meaning that, although these 
values are an important feature of the industrial revolution, it is slightly hasty to pretend 
that the Reform ignited economic development, adding that there was evidence that the 
opposite, economic development having preceded and stimulated the Reform, was true 
in many parts of Protestant Europe (Hénaff, 2000, p 38). The simplicity of this 
interaction, despite Weber’s doubts, was enough, though, to convince a good set of 
scholars that the attitudes preached by Protestantism were essential to trigger any sort of 
development process and that, therefore, any developing community should adopt them. 
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More recently, D. Landes (2002) (2000), goes beyond the religious, and ethical, 
factor in development and pretends to show how other cultural features, such as national 
identity, scientific curiosity and the ability to apply it to economic ends, tolerance or 
independence from the religious dogma, can give a better explanation of the Western 
European precocity of development. In fact the essence of Landes’ purpose, in his work, 
is showing why the industrial revolution took place in Western Europe (and later in the 
United States) and not in so many others parts of the world that, at the time, could be 
considered, in some regard, at the peak of civilization. An unwary reader might 
conclude that the most favourable attitude to development is deeply rooted in the 
western culture and that, therefore, the needed cultural change means the adoption of 
western culture. Underdevelopment, or delay in development, should, then, be the result 
of a strong attachment to local traditional values and beliefs, and of a refusal to adopt 
western culture.  
 
From this verification to the enlightened conclusion that underdevelopment was 
essentially a state of mind, there was only a very small step that L. Harrison (1985) had 
already made in the mid eighties. Although all these new cultural determinists are 
clearly inspired by Weber, they do not seem to be as cautious. For them there is little 
room for doubts concerning the way of the causality, culture matters because culture 
determines development. Nevertheless, accepting that culture matters to development 
shouldn’t imply that there has to be only one, or any, kind of causality between them. 
Some of the attitudes described as favourable to development may in fact be produced 
by development itself. R. Inglehart and W. Baker (2000) show it very clearly, pointing 
out not only a vast group of scholars defending each of the positions, but also numerous 
empirical examples of the two causality hypothesis. It seems, indeed, quite admissible 
that changes in the ways one produces and in the ways one consumes can lead to 
changes in the way one perceives its community at large and himself within it, the same 
happening with the ways in which the others and the world are perceived. On the other 
hand the fact that some attitudes and beliefs, such as the renunciation to all worldly 
goods in some Hindu sects, can easily be accepted as an obstacle to development, 
clearly plays in favour of cultural determinism.  
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THE MATTER WITH CULTURE 
 
Although this debate has been responsible for a considerable amount of printed-
paper, some appealing, some other rather vain, the purpose of this essay is not to 
demonstrate who is right and who is wrong. The issue here is pluralism and therefore 
the question I ask is: Is there a culture best fit to promote development, is that culture 
western culture and, thus, do other cultures have to be considered as obstacles to 
development? In order to answer this question I will, firstly, present in which manner 
some of the cultural features of the third world conflict with development along the 
lines of the culturalist approach to development. Secondly, I will try to give a different 
explanation to the source of the conflicts identified above and operate a shift from an 
alleged intrinsic cultural incompatibility to a historically acquired resistance to an 
imposed vision of modernity. In order to simplify this essay I will focus on some of the 
most referred to cultural features that matter in a development process. These are: 
religion, family and patterns of kinship, and, finally, attitudes towards material 
advancement and entrepreneurship. 
 
 
Religion 
 
A chapter on religion should imperatively start by stressing that in social science 
literature in general low secular influence on thought and behaviour hinders economic 
development in the sense that one’s fate is handled by another entity than oneself and, 
therefore, would foster resignation and immobility. The question, therefore, has not 
been to determine how good or bad can religion be for development but to identify 
values and attitudes specific to each religious belief and compare their ability to 
promote development along Weberian lines. We have already mentioned the classic 
conclusions of the Weberian approach of the interaction of cultural factors and 
economic development which is that Protestant ethics and values, especially when 
compared to Catholic ones, played a decisive role in the development of capitalism.  
 
 In relation to the protestant advantage, M. Hénaff sustains that, in order to 
understand the differences between the development process in northern and southern 
Europe, we shouldn’t look for it in the Protestantism and Catholicism opposition, as 
much as we should in the Roman versus Anglo-Saxon traditional law confrontation (to 
which we could add the Scandinavian and the ancient German law) and the political 
institutions that result from them (Hénaff, 2000, p 61). In the Roman tradition, human 
law is conceived as stemming from the order of the world. Principles are highly 
considered and the role of deduction and speculative abstraction is central in matters of 
justice and morality. In the Protestant tradition, on the contrary, priority is given to 
experience, to each case, to the local, to the feasible, to the experiment of all 
possibilities without an a priori judgement (Hénaff, 2000, p 62). 
 
 Regarding political institutions, the Roman tradition establishes the 
unconditional character of the sovereign’s power. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, on the 
contrary, sovereignty is delegated (Hénaff 2000, p 62-63). In terms of the 
administration, the principles are the same, in the Roman tradition it is the central 
administration that decides all, whereas in the Anglo-Saxon tradition matters that can be 
decided locally need not be taken higher up in the hierarchy of the State. In England, for 
example, county sheriffs and judges have been elected since the 12th century whereas in 
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France the need is felt to designate the public servants from the centre and, very often, 
to make sure that they come from a region other than the one to which they were 
appointed (Hénaff 2000, p 62-63). This procedure is, actually, still largely followed in 
today’s French administration. 
 
 The centrality tradition gave French kings the possibility of deciding, more or 
less by themselves, the nature and the level of taxes; consequently taxation struck 
essentially the productive population leaving the socially inactive elites free of charges. 
In England, on the contrary, the monarchy was obliged to negotiate with different social 
groups. Taxes were now decided in common and the tax burden was more equitably 
distributed. The fact that the government became more public and accountable also 
allowed higher levels of taxation than in Continental Europe (Epstein 1995, p 176). 
According to M. Hénaff (2000, p 63), this resulted in innovation and competitiveness 
with long-lasting benefits for all. From an institutional point of view this would explain 
why England was better prepared to launch the industrial revolution than France, in 
spite of the fact that their economies seemed to be growing at a similar rate during the 
eighteenth century (Epstein 1995, p 175). 
 
Therefore, the noticeable differences between the southern and the northern 
European development processes have a political rather than a religious foundation. 
What seems to be the work of religion could, in fact, be the work of something else. In 
addition, when European Catholic countries started to show higher growth rates than 
Protestant ones the explanation was no longer very pertinent and what was considered a 
Protestant advantage became a Christian and Western advantage. Indeed, in his studies 
on Asia M. Weber himself would come to the conclusion that Asian values would 
explain why economic development was much slower there than in Europe (Weber, 
1964) (Shixue, 1999) (Sen, 2004). Confucianism, for example, was bad for capitalist 
development, because, amongst other reasons, in its essence, it despises commerce (Lê 
Thàn Khôi, 1992). 
 
 When Japan, whose culture is deeply influenced by Confucianism, started to 
grow faster than western countries the Confucian obstacle, in turn, lost its validity. 
From then on several works tried to demonstrate the potential of Confucian values for 
capitalist development. The emphasis put on education, on loyalty, on family sobriety 
and work ethic (Han-Yin Chang, 2003) (Jiang Shixue, 1999) (Lê Thàn Khôi, 1992) 
(Morishima, 1982), were, then, at the source of the new Asian economic miracle. After 
Weber’s own conclusions about the unsuitableness of Confucian values for capitalist 
development, the values that were supposed to have ignited Japanese economic growth 
were in fact very close to Protestantism, we could almost speak of an Asian version of 
the Protestant ethics. A new question then arose; why were the other East Asian 
countries profoundly influenced by Confucianism left aside of this process? Fortunately, 
the question didn’t last for long, as countries like Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong, in their turn, started to grow very fast. The only remaining doubts on the ability 
of Confucian values to promote economic development were related to the incapability 
of Continental China to join its neighbours on the same path. 
 
 In this regard, whereas Confucianism could be seen as a factor of development 
in Japan, in China, on the contrary, it resulted in conformism, immobility and 
intellectual isolation (Lê Thàn Khôi, 1992, p 159). The Chinese dominant class, the 
Mandarins, has always been hostile to the development of capitalism because it would 
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jeopardize their privileges. On the contrary Japanese dominant class was composed of 
warriors, the Samurais, for whom Confucianism was mainly a form of government and 
who were eager to beat the West on its own grounds (Lê Thàn Khôi, 1992). In 
conclusion, if Japan and China share the common Confucian cultural fund the 
differences between their class structures would be responsible for their different 
economic and social records. Therefore, religious beliefs and its values could not 
explain as much as class and power the reason why Japan was developing already since 
the end of the 19th century and not China. History and Politics would, thus, be more 
decisive than culture in this case. Finally, the rapid growth rate observed in China since 
the last decade of the 20th century contributed to mitigate, once again, the impact of the 
cultural argument of underdevelopment. 
 
At this stage, if the cultural argument shakes with Confucianism, it certainly will 
not fall with Hinduism, in regard not only of the extreme poverty noticeable in India but 
also of the notorious aspects in which any less distracted observer can point out clear 
obstacles to development. As referred to above, some Hindu sects display an extreme 
detachment in relation to material wealth which, although recognizing the radicalism of 
these interpretations of Hinduism, can only but lead us to the conclusion that there must 
be something in between this faith and economic development. In addition, 
vegetarianism and the consecration of cows were as much interference on farm 
efficiency as the aversion for pigs described amongst Muslims by Myrdal. The caste 
system, in turn, was responsible for social and economic immobility, namely in terms of 
strict labour specialization. To this we could add the fact that caste system has 
constituted the perfect ground for rent seeking behaviours and therefore to the waste of 
public money (Osborne, 2001). Regarding sacred cows and other western clichés, as 
naked fakirs, much could be said. Concerning the Hindu distaste for wealth the 
argument is not very solid as Artha, the possession of material goods, is one of the 
recognized goals of human existence in Hinduism (Lê Thàn Khôi, 1992, p 161). In 
relation to the caste system it is not my purpose to proceed to its rehabilitation here, as 
this system is responsible for vast and unacceptable inequalities, but one should be very 
careful in associating caste with Hinduism. India’s caste system is thought to have 
arisen through violent inter-communal struggles that relegated the vanquished to 
undesirable occupations (Kuran, 2004) and can be traced back to the settling of the 
Ganges Plain (Osborne, 2001). The religious connection one may establish between 
caste and religion is related to the system’s remarkable stability over the time. Hinduism 
and its belief in reincarnation, certainly contributed to legitimize the discriminatory 
features of the caste system, pretending they were the just retributions for sins 
committed in previous lives (Kuran, 2004) (Lal, 1999), but beyond this aspect its 
religious foundations are quite questionable. In addition, this system appears to have 
absorbed a great variety of non-Hindus over the centuries (Osborne, 2001). 
 
If development at one time could be considered a Western or Christian 
phenomenon there is no doubt that the classic and historical confrontation with Islam 
would surely bring some brighter light to the religious connection of underdevelopment. 
The poor attention given to education and the well known and still prevailing contempt 
for interest seem good enough reasons to ascribe the noticeable underdevelopment of 
the majority of Muslim countries to their religious beliefs. Once again, cultural 
determinism reveals its difficulties to deal with complexity. No religion has a particular 
attraction for interest, not even the Protestantism, and its prohibition, in Islam has been 
clearly overstated. It appears to result from fundamentalist readings of the words of the 
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prophet and ignorance of the concrete historical facts that, fourteen centuries ago, led to 
anti-interest religious precepts (Kuran, 2004, p 133). Today, in practice, and after a 
quarter of a century of Islamic banking experiences, their market share averages around 
1% in those Muslim majority countries where both Islamic and non-Islamic types of 
banks are allowed (Kuran, 2004, p 123). This means that even where a great majority of 
the population follow strict religious precepts this doesn’t seem to interfere dramatically 
with their economic choices concerning the use of interest. Although there seems to be a 
slow running away of Islam from economics, seen almost as a perversion (Al-Naquid, 
2000), we have to admit that it is a relatively recent and isolated phenomenon and, 
therefore, to impute it to some kind of Muslim tradition of despite in relation to 
economic affairs is very exaggerated. One shouldn’t forget that the Islamic world is 
responsible for some of the most important scientific improvements in the history of 
mankind; in economics for instance, the works of Ibn Khaldun, dating from the 14th 
century, were precociously similar, in some of its conclusions, to Adam Smiths’, who 
wrote in the 18th century (Baeck, 1994). 
 
As to attitudes towards science and education, facts seem to speak for 
themselves. In terms of the level of adult literacy, Muslim countries are placed far 
behind other countries with the same standards of economic well-being, (PNUD, 2004), 
and the disparity is even more striking if we compare the figures exclusively for 
women. I agree that when society denies girls an education it is condemning all children 
to be raised by ignorant mothers (Kuran, 2004, p 132), with negative consequences for 
society if one wants to raise the average level of education amongst the population. 
Nevertheless one should be very careful when relations are established between 
education and economic growth. If praise on education is consensually favourable to 
economic growth that doesn’t forcibly mean that the opposite is also true, in other 
words, that disregard for education is incompatible with economic growth. Portugal, a 
southern European Catholic country living under a totalitarian regime saw its literacy 
rate climb from 60% to 67% of the population between 1960 and 1970 (Barreto, Preto, 
1996); two figures that are comparable to the average literacy rate in Arab countries and 
inferior to the average rate of all developing countries in 2002. It should be added that 
the performance of women during this period was consistently inferior to men’s, and, 
today, the illiteracy rate amongst them is still twice the one prevailing for men 
(Comissão Para a Igualdade e os Direitos das Mulheres, 2000). In spite of this very low 
and unequal level of education Portugal’s economic performance didn’t seem very 
much affected, and the GNP grew at an average rate of around 7% per year between 
1960 and 1970 (Barreto, Preto, 1996). We have doubts that this growth pattern could 
have been sustainable in the future, nevertheless during the sixties Portugal was 
included, in accordance with international standards, in the restricted and promising 
group of the New Industrialised Countries. 
 
The next question we should ask is if the connection between poor education and 
Islam can be established only based on the observation of poor literacy rates. Research 
in three villages of Kerala, in south-western India, show that where the Christian 
community was the largest more emphasis was given to education and, on the opposite, 
amidst a Muslim majority, less importance was given to it (Kurien, 1994). This research 
could strengthen the arguments of those that consider religion to have a strong influence 
on the rhythm of the development process, but P. Kurien puts forward another 
explanation. During the British rule of India the Muslim community was the most 
affected by repression and even today it is still hard to dissociate education, 
 8 
bureaucracy, and medicine, from the British. Thus, what seemed to be a simple cultural 
rejection of progressive values is also, and perhaps mainly, the rejection of the symbols 
of colonial repression. On the other hand, because of the missionaries, the native 
Christians were accorded special favours by the colonial authorities (Kurien, 1994) and, 
thus, were able to grasp the advantages of investing in education much quicker. This 
kind of colonial discriminatory modernization in favour of Christianized populations 
when in contact with Muslims also seemed to have happened in Sudan (Deng, 1998), 
strengthening the historical and political argument in detriment of the cultural and 
religious. 
 
 
Family and Patterns of Kinship 
 
In general terms, traditional analysis in development economics finds that the 
extended family, in other words kinship links beyond the nuclear family, is an obstacle 
to economic development. The main argument claims that it has an inhibiting effect on 
many of the factors that are taken to stimulate economic development such as mobility, 
saving, risk taking and even willingness to work for a higher price (Herrick, 
Kindleberger, 1983, p 102). In other words, extended family is a drag on effort (Lewis, 
1955, p 114). Extended family would discourage saving, for example, because kin 
would have access to funds accumulated and, therefore, any effort to save, with 
productive investment in mind, would be vain as one would have to take into account 
unproductive needs resulting from the kin obligations (Moore, 1997, p 300), like 
financing the studies of brothers, cousins, nephews and nieces, lodge newcomers and 
finance the multitude of ceremonies that, for example, fill African social life (Etounga-
Manguelle, 2000, p 72).  
 
In addition, regression analysis appears to show that family scale is strongly 
related to corruption (Lipset and Lenz, 2000), communitarian and familistic cultures 
being more favourable to the development of corruption than those where individualism 
and self reliance prevail. This could explain the higher levels of corruption in Catholic 
societies, conventionally seen as mainly familistic and communitarian, when compared 
to Protestant ones, more individualistic. This interpretation also provides an easily 
understandable explanation for the African records of corruption. In relation to this last 
conclusion one should, nevertheless, be more careful with what is to be considered as 
corruption. Indeed, amidst a society where family ties are very important what is usually 
considered as corruption on the part of government or other officials could be seen by 
others as the fulfilment of traditional expectations that gifts should be given to one’s 
family or clan members (Verhelst, Tindale, 2002). 
 
The superiority of individualistic driven societies when compared to more 
familistic and communitarian societies finds another argument in the capacity of each of 
them in building formal institutions that supply protection to economic activity, namely 
commerce and especially long distance commerce. A. Greif (1993) comparing the more 
individualist Genovese traders with the more collectivist Maghrebi traders in medieval 
Mediterranean trading networks, shows why individualists were more likely to develop 
formal institutional enforcement mechanisms to manage their activities whereas 
collectivists were more likely to develop informal systems. The argument is that 
informal institutions like extended family, tightly connected to communitarian societies, 
would be less efficient in providing the security needed to nurture commerce. In East 
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and Southeast Asia, nevertheless, this did not seem to be an obstacle to the development 
of even long distance commerce; there the lack of the rule of law was effectively 
substituted by family ties as well as informal ties that extended beyond the family 
(Perkins, 2000). As a matter of fact family ties instead of constituting an obstacle to 
modern corporate economy are taken, even today, as one of the strengths of the East 
Asian economic model. 
 
Beyond the aspects related with the positive self perception of the sociability of 
large family ties by its members, extended family can also be understood in terms of 
economic rationality. It is true that if one considers economic development as the result 
of individual effort only, family can easily be seen as a tick on one’s motivation to 
progress, but if it is not the case, that is to say, if one doesn’t believe in this 
individualistic vision of development and prefer a more realistic one, according to 
which, business is strongly embedded in the social relations (see Granovetter, 1992), it 
is possible to invert the consequences of extended family without, even, having to 
change one’s logic. Thus, instead of simply consuming capital, kin could be a source of 
additional capital, families also have a central role in the promotion of skills and 
therefore in the formation of human capital (Bates, 2000, p 131) (CDD-Ghana, 2001, p 
28). Employees might work harder because of a sense of obligation to the family; 
suppliers could provide unusually favourable credit terms to kinsman because they 
expect them to feel obligated not to let them down. What should be stressed is that 
individualistic values are not indispensable to economic development, or to capitalist 
development according to the Weberian model, on the contrary, non individualistic 
values can also promote development, even capitalist development, and the East Asian 
communitarianism (Han-Yin Chang, 2003) from Japan to Singapore, is the living proof 
of that. 
 
 Furthermore, in the absence of proper formal institutions extended family 
provides a system of insurance, or social security, against common setbacks of life, 
either economic or not, such as crop failure, unemployment, high death rates (Herrick, 
Kindleberger, 1983, p103) (Lal, 1999) or migrant hazard (Bates, 2000, p 131), it is also 
an institution for contract enforcement and for reducing transaction costs and finally a 
financing institution, with a special reference for the system of the tontine, a rotating 
credit pool that mobilises funds for business start-up, which demonstrates not only the 
vigour of community initiative but also the importance of the role of women who, in 
Western Africa, dominate this sector. The existence of some kind of formal safety net 
that could mitigate bad fortune would, as a matter of fact, probably contribute to a 
change in the family patterns, more effectively than many kinds of active policy. 
Pioneers of development studies P. Bauer and B. Yamey stated, as early as in 1957, that 
as the economy develops and becomes increasingly removed from the subsistence stage, 
the concept of the family narrows and the number of people with whom individuals 
recognise family obligations tends to become smaller (Bauer, Yamey, 1957, p66-67).  
 
One last remark; in September 2004 at a conference on the Development 
Concept, at Bordeaux, France, a colleague in the audience sustained that extended 
family fosters demographic growth and that is one of the major problems of the 
developing countries, namely in Africa. Indeed, it is not hard to accept that the positive 
valuation of a large family jeopardizes the efforts of birth control policies. If the size of 
the family matters a lot then one should normally expect that this would induce high 
demographic growth. Nevertheless, one can turn the argument upside down. In 
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extended family it’s not the number of children of the nuclear family as much the 
extension of the family ties that counts and, therefore, the benefits of family should not 
impose on one to have as many children as one can, although it undoubtedly exerts a 
certain pressure. In the absence of institutions that provide a safety net the substitution 
of the extended family by the nuclear one would probably foster demographic growth 
even more, because one would now depend only on one’s children, in the old age for 
example, and no longer on a myriad of other relatives. I do not believe that a shift in the 
family patterns is a condition for slowing demographic growth. A rise in schooling – 
especially concerning women – a growth in family income, a reduction in infant 
mortality and the creation of some sort of social security system, have more chances of 
inflecting the demographic trend in developing countries (Todaro, 1994, p 201). 
 
Trying to change the cultural patterns in order to accommodate the family unit to 
the goal of accumulation, which is to privilege the nuclear family, might, then, be a 
wrong prescription because, in the absence of a set of improvements in people’s lives, 
as seen above, the result could be the concomitance of poverty and social isolation 
(Moore, 1997, p 319-320). Thus, the transposition of some modernist ideals, as 
founding the housing policy on the construction of apartment buildings, clearly 
presuming a nuclear family, in other words a western European type of family, not only 
might aggravate the living conditions of the third world population, because it cuts the 
safety net which contributes to alleviating poverty, but also becomes a threat to cultural 
pluralism, imposing individualistic behaviour and excluding other forms of interaction 
of man and the social system. 
 
 
Attitudes Towards Material Advancement and Entrepreneurship 
 
 Recapturing the words of W. W. Rostow (1960) at the beginning of this text, 
development is supposed to be mainly an attitude. L. Harrison (1985) complies, and for 
him underdevelopment is a state of mind. The time has come to deepen slightly this 
matter. According to D. Etounga-Menguelle (2000) (2002) a high degree of fatalism, 
irrationalism and occult beliefs and a focus on the past and present not on the future, all 
taken to be part of the Africanity, contribute to a bad general attitude towards material 
advancement and entrepreneurship. In an earlier work, W.W. Rostow (1952) identified 
six individual or collective propensities supposed to demonstrate the connection 
between non-economic variables and economic growth. One of these six was the 
propensity to seek material advancement. The argument is very plain; if one doesn’t 
really aim for wealth one cannot reach it.  
 
 For development economists it has always seemed strange that people would not 
bother to work for more wages once they had earned enough to pay the tax or that poor 
farmers would spend their exiguous income on lavish festivals instead of investing in 
their land (Douglas, 2004). It seemed as if people in developing countries didn’t seem 
interested in greater prosperity, that other goals were better valued. Indeed, in the usual 
vision of the traditional society it is commonly accepted that, here, economic 
imperatives are less important than the symbolic ones (Freyssinet, 1966). In traditional 
societies agriculture, for example, is not just simply an activity with nutritional, or 
otherwise productive, ends. Men manipulate instruments as much as they perform rites 
(Dockès, Rosier, 1988). In these rites men relate, not only to nature and the divinities, 
but also to the ancestors. In the Island of New Britain, Papua-New Guinea, amongst the 
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Mae Enge people, horticulture does not signify the transformation of the matter, a fight 
against nature, but an exchange with the ancestors and the gods, and the good or bad 
results of the harvests depend on whether they have been well honoured or not 
(Godelier, 1986, p 55). Amongst the Dinka of Sudan, for example, power and wealth 
must serve moral and social ends or else they do not confer the community’s respect on 
the holder (Deng, 1998, p 114). 
 
 Instead of any consideration on the reasons for such behaviour, one should stress 
that, again, this is especially crucial if one considers self interest the only engine of 
development. The question of whether development derives from individualism or, on 
the contrary, results from a collective project, arises once again. Explaining why 
Singapore has succeeded in development, Han-Yin Chang (2003) states that the 
communitarian character of economic policy played an important role, and he adds that 
one of the major aspects of this communitarianism is to define the interest of the whole 
nation as of paramount importance and perceive individuals’ interest derivable from 
the well being of the nation (Han-Yin Chang, 2003, p 91). The ways in which society 
evolves need not to be singular, there is ample room for plural options as the different 
experiences of the West and the East have shown. 
 
 Anchored in the individual or in the collective, any society can only hope for 
better times if it holds some kind of perception of the future. There is some kind of 
consensus that without it, the course of events can hardly be affected, allowing long 
term fatalism to get installed (Rostow, 1960) and condemning society to immobility and 
deprivation. In rural traditional culture there is a strong entanglement of the present and 
the past, the future often being another display of this entanglement; the African for 
instance, is so anchored in his ancestral culture that he is convinced that the past can 
only repeat itself (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000). Therefore, one worries little about the 
future, and concentrates more in revering the ancestors and the old. In Madagascar, for 
example, one feels obliged to bring the newborn’s placenta to the grave of the ancestors 
in order to respect the tradition (Rakotoarisoa, 2002), as if saying that the future is 
nothing but an eternal recommencement. Almost all around Africa the land traditionally 
belongs to the community, although it may be individually exploited; the symbolic 
justification for this is that it belongs in fact to the ancestors, the chief being some sort 
of keeper (Ayittey, 1992, p 2). The Dinka, in southern Sudan, extol their ancestors in 
such a way that no member of this community would ever claim to have done better 
than his forefathers (Deng, 1998, p 110). Another display of this attraction for the past 
can be found in the somewhat reification of the pre-colonial Africa, considered by A. 
Kabou (1991) as a symptom of the African incapacity to access modernity. Although 
she admits that this is also a subterfuge to overcome the shame of colonization. 
 
 So Africans turn to the past rather than to the future, but why? Why should 
Africans spend their money in their tomb in preference to investing it in commodities or 
assets? Probably because life is dramatically ephemeral! Indeed, life expectation in sub-
Saharan Africa is very low and almost unchanged during the last 35 years, the average 
for the period of 1970-75 was of 45 years, and for the period 2000-2005 the estimated 
average was of 46 years (PNUD, 2004). In addition, almost half of its population has no 
probability of reaching the age of 40 (PNUD, 2002). With these poor health conditions, 
how can one seriously blame Africans for not thinking too much about the future? It is 
well accepted that amidst an uncertain universe, agents tend to prefer both the short 
term and intergenerational investments (Hugon, 2001, 58). In the short term they tend to 
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pick the options that preserve the greatest amount of possibilities to change the route or 
simply to back up, therefore, there is a strong preference for liquidity and a choice for 
monetary and financial assets rather than for productive assets (Hugon, 2001, p 58). 
Families also favour the extreme long-term options, especially betting on people, either 
saving for education or plainly investing on demographic growth. 
 
 That is why what seems, on a first glance, like irrationality to economists is 
probably just another form of rationality. The western view of rationality describes it in 
a way that makes it almost a synonym of economic efficiency; therefore, any act 
involving economic means without concern for the maximization of productive output 
or the minimization of the former, in other words for the multiplication of an initial 
asset endowment, is seen as irrational. An act can be considered rational if it combines 
efficacy, efficiency and consistency. Efficacy literally means that it produces the 
expected outcome, therefore it needs to take people’s goals into account. Efficiency is a 
quantitative calculation in terms of the effort and time involved in the process of 
attaining a goal, and, finally, consistency requires that one should make a choice of 
means that is conducive to the goal, and that, while pursuing an objective, one shouldn’t 
jeopardize another. All of this features the human form of life (Nussbaum, 1995, pp 76-
80) and there is no a-priori reason to believe that the major part of the world’s 
population is deprived of these characteristics. What differs from place to place, or from 
culture to culture, is not so much the degree of rationality, but just the ways in which 
people conduct their affairs and the purposes considered (Tshikuku, 2001, p 9). 
 
 Thus, when one notices that a typical African parcel of land is encumbered by 
several crops against the grain of technological rationality, or when the farmer 
minimizes risks instead of maximizing yields, one should take into consideration that 
under the constraint of a very uncertain environment the rational behaviour is, precisely, 
to ensure the strongest level of security to the group, and the highest level of protection 
to the environment (De Kadt, 1999, p 153) (Gu-Konu, 1984, p 490). Therefore, if 
people’s behaviours do not match what traditional microeconomics considers rational, 
should we conclude that people are wrong? 
 
 The alleged irrationality of the economic behaviour in developing countries can 
also be explained by history and social structure, repelling as above the cultural 
argument. If an African worker, or any other worker in the third world for this purpose, 
works less when offered a higher pay, one shouldn’t immediately ascribe it to a cultural 
related irrationality or to a weak work ethic. The mercantilists in seventeenth century 
Europe also noticed that when the wage went up workers worked less, and dedicated 
their gleaned leisure to alcohol and prostitutes. They concluded that the only way to 
keep them interested in production was to pay them poorly, just enough for them and 
their family to survive. William Petty, for example, laid the blame on the worker’s 
intrinsic low level of morality, whereas the high level of mortality and the almost 
inexistent social mobility that rendered effort useless and incited the workers to seize 
the day, could more convincingly explain this behaviour. M. Godelier (1986,) shows 
why the fact that the ancient Greeks despised work was not as much related to some 
cultural, or philosophical, option, as to the connection they established with slavery, the 
main supplier of labour in Greek’s economy. This negative relation with work is, 
therefore, more connected to class differentiation than to some attitude related to a 
cultural foundation of ancient Greeks’ society. Is there any reason to believe the story 
should be radically different in Africa, or in the rest of the third world? 
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 The hundreds of years of slavery that affected Africa, from the 8th century till the 
19th century, first by the hand of the Arabs, to feed the labour markets of the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, and by the Europeans onwards, to feed the labour 
markets of the Americas is not such a distant reality after all. Furthermore, although 
slavery was prohibited in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, it continued under different 
shapes, one of them being compulsory, but paid, work. In Latin America one speaks of 
working like a Negro or like an Indian to refer to strenuous effort (Jiang Sixue, 1999, p 
27). How can one ignore the history of almost a thousand years, and the memory of 
millions of men and women killed by disease, extenuation and murder, at the time of 
ascribing a certain aversion to work to a sort of culturally embedded laziness of African 
people? It’s not only of dubious taste but perhaps just plainly based on wrong premises. 
Indeed, if work had meant humiliation and death to the Protestants, in opposition to 
wealth, would economists be talking, today, of a Protestant work ethic? I believe that 
poor work ethic in developing countries is much more related to work relations 
established during colonial occupation and to the historically low reward for hard work 
(Douglas, 2004, 89) (Porter, 2000, p 23) than to some cultural inheritance. 
 
 As a matter of fact, we could find several examples of an African work ethic. In 
Nigeria, for example, innumerable Yoruba maxims and folk songs praise effort and 
stigmatize laziness, allowing R. Soetan (2001, pp 8-10), to say that the Yoruba have 
always extolled the merits of labour industry and thrift amongst citizenry from youth. 
Markets and trade have always been part of the African everyday life, and amidst 
enormous difficulties African merchants display a fantastic and imaginative capability 
to thrive, or simply to survive. The energy shown by the informal economy should 
silence all those that still believe in a cultural obstacle to entrepreneurship. The problem 
does not concern entrepreneurship in small-scale enterprise but in larger investments. In 
this particular field native African participation is quite marginal (Tshikuku, 2001, p 
12). 
  
 As M. Porter puts it well the most basic belief undergirding successful economic 
development is acceptance that prosperity depends on productivity, not on control over 
the resources (Porter, 2000, p 21). The question one should ask is why this does not 
happen in many cases, especially in Africa. Looking at the structure of a major part of 
African economies one cannot miss the decisive weight of the export of a scarce variety 
of natural resources, or plantation crops. According to P. Collier and J. W. Gunning 
(1999, p 9) this kind of structure has shown a tendency to lead to loot-seeking activities. 
The gains to an extractive strategy, an euphemism for loot, are closely related to the size 
of the ruling elite group (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 200, p 1376), thus, when the 
elite is not abundant, each member can expect a larger piece of the cake and so, the 
smaller the elite group, and we could add the more unequal the income distribution, the 
greater the incentives to be extractive. In this case both the economic and the social 
structure in many African countries, a clear inheritance of colonization in the beginning, 
and dependent development onwards, would be more responsible for the lack of interest 
in creating wealth than some kind cultural detachment. 
  
 The inexistence of real markets can also partly explain such unwillingness for 
enterprise (van de Walle, 2000) but we should not stop at the neo-classical interpretation 
of the absence of real markets in developing countries, namely excessive state 
intervention and corrupted institutions (van de Walle, 2000) (Collier, Gunning, 1999) 
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(Hunt, 1989) (Lal, 1985). Markets are considered to be the perfect tool to satisfy the 
rational allocation of scarce resources, and therefore they can contribute to solve the real 
problems of citizens, but they can also satisfy and perpetuate ceremonial ends when free 
markets are driven by the wealthy few (Elliott, Harvey, 2000). Thus, when the 
requirements for the operation of effective private markets (see Keyfitz, Dorfman, cited 
in Todaro, 1994, pp 587-588) are not fulfilled, imposing a sham free market can leave 
people worse-off than they were before and can only contribute to demoralize 
entrepreneurship. The problem, therefore, is not an inability to generate accumulation as 
much as a lack of interest in capitalist accumulation. This logic applies when E. Ndione 
(1992, p 190) says that in Dakar wealth isn’t measured by the accumulation of financial 
capital but through the amount of connections one can mobilize to his, or to his social 
group’s, advantage. 
 
 
THE HEART OF THE MATTER 
 
 In the previous sections we have seen that colonization, scarcity of social and 
economic institutions and poor health and insecurity, were, partly, responsible for the 
resilience of such cultural features as, dependence from religious dogma, extended 
families, and lack of entrepreneurship. Put all together, the reasons for the resilience of 
these cultural features almost make up a treaty on underdevelopment. One of the 
reasons that can explain the durability of the caste system in India, for example, is the 
fact that this system is well adapted to the rent seeking logic that prevails in Indian 
governance, as it organizes itself quite easily as a pressure group (Osborne, 2001), the 
same happening with tribes and ethnic groups in other parts of the world. Therefore, 
culture is not an obstacle to development as much as it is a means of resisting or 
adapting to underdevelopment. 
 
 Underdevelopment shouldn’t be seen here as a mere delay or inability in the 
process of development, but as the result of the implementation, in the last half of the 
twentieth century, of a particular development model. This model was characterized, 
amongst other features, by policies almost exclusively driven by the state, a corrupt and 
authoritarian state, often representing foreign interests, an excessive specialization 
around the export of natural resources and plantation crops, the exploitation of the rural 
society by urban oriented policies, historical dependence from colonial powers through 
occupation at first and unequal trade afterwards, and a financial system that favoured 
the funding of large projects connected to the elites, and to the quest of external markets 
for the exporting industry in the developed countries, that left an unbearable debt burden 
for years to come. This social and political environment conditioned the evolution of the 
traditional society and the cultural institutions of developing countries proved to be 
remarkably adapted to this underdevelopment model. 
 
 Let me draw, now, some intermediate conclusions that pretend to contradict the 
deterministic orthodox vision of the interaction of culture and development. One basic 
problem with cultural deterministic theories is the underlying presupposition that 
culture is largely immutable allowing the world to be methodically sliced into 
civilizations and cultures, ignoring the fact that cultures also change and that they are 
seldom homogenous, although there is a noticeable continuity in values and traditions 
within societies (PNUD, 2004) The fact that some of the cultural features that we have 
seen above were notoriously shaped by exogenous interference prove that they are the 
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result of an evolution, the outcome of history and of the development process 
(Kaarsholm, 1994, 121), therefore it is quite simplistic to take culture as a brake to 
change. F. Deng about the apparent Nilotic people conservatism in Sudan, that made 
them resist to change, sustains that this was fostered by colonial policies which kept the 
tribes isolated and sought to preserve traditional cultures; on the contrary, in result of 
today’s intensive cross cultural interaction and modern education, Nilotics are 
demonstrating more adaptability to change than could have been predicted only two 
decades ago (Deng, 1998, p 115). 
 
 There is also a methodological mistake that compromises cultural determinism. 
It’s not because people share important cultural features that one has to conclude that 
they are overwhelmingly determined by it in every aspect of their lives. If one tries to 
characterize individuals in terms of personality traits or generalized motives, one 
usually discovers that individuals within cultures vary much more among themselves 
than they do from individuals in other cultures (Kaplan, 1954, p 18). It is, therefore, 
possible for different modal personality systems to be associated with similar social 
systems, and for similar modal personality systems to be associated with different social 
systems (Schwedder, 2000, p 164). The example, given above, about the individuals’ 
preference for banks operating with interest in relation to Islamic banks in Muslim 
countries, shows clearly that one’s culture, and in this case one’s religion, does not 
completely determines all behaviours, even less in the economic sphere. 
 
 Finally, most of the time culture isn’t an obstacle to development as much as an 
instrument in resisting underdevelopment. Indeed, the core values of African society 
shared concern for the vulnerable and, therefore, have sustained Africa through decades 
of crisis (CDD-Ghana, 2001). That is to say that without their cultural institutions 
people, in a great number of developing countries, would probably be worse-off 
nowadays. Furthermore, what seems at first glance to be resistance to change may 
ultimately be just a different strategy to obtain more consistent gains. In Minigo village, 
in Tarime district, Tanzania, men refused, in 1986, an offer of manually powered 
grinding mills because, according to the chief, “it would make their wives lazy”. In fact 
what the village was apparently trying to convey was the fact that the time of manual 
grinding mills had passed and were hoping that if they refused them, the donors would 
be willing to give them diesel-powered grinding mills, which would not only help the 
women but also bring revenue to the village (Anacleti, 2002, p 171-172). 
 
 If culture is not immutable, if culture is not really the obstacle cultural 
determinists sustain, why is there such a novel insistence on this matter in recent years? 
In social sciences an argument easily becomes a speech, and what is supposed to be a 
neutral observation can perversely slide into a committed vision. Therefore, what is the 
vision, what is the speech, surfacing the cultural deterministic arguments? Firstly, the 
idea that the major obstacles to development can be found in a society’s culture is meant 
to signify that the roots of underdevelopment are essentially endogenous. This is to say 
that the problem resides in the adoption by the individual of beliefs and attitudes that 
hinder progress, or in other words, that the source of underdevelopment is not political, 
and not related to the historical dominant modes of value production and income 
distribution, and to its inherent conflicts. This also means that the source of the problem 
is not exogenous, or that one shouldn’t look for an explanation of underdevelopment 
within the relations developing countries have established with western developed 
countries, further, that there is no room for dependence and domination. The major 
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significance of this argument, finally, is that the victim and the guilty are one and the 
same person and that the recognition of this fact, along with the indulgence of the 
developed countries, is the first step towards real development. 
 
 On the contrary, the alternative vision proposed in this text reintroduces North-
South relations, history and politics. The vision of culture as an obstacle to development 
is replaced by one where culture in the developing countries is also the outcome of the 
community’s response to an unfavourable political and economical environment and, 
sometimes even, the result of the manipulation of traditional institutions with the 
purpose of imposing external domination. This does not mean that culture cannot be a 
problem and that all wrongs lay abroad. In many cases we clearly perceive a resistance 
to change in some cultural practices but we should not ascribe it forcibly to an intrinsic 
resistance to change of a particular culture. We shouldn’t ignore that the local elites 
frequently use culture in order to legitimize the status quo, and, therefore, to preserve 
their economic privileges and political control.  
 
 
HOW CULTURE MATTERS 
 
 Modernization theorists believed that cultural change was an important and 
decisive part of the development process, the new cultural determinists, in their turn, 
sustain that culture makes almost all the difference. In both cases cultural change clearly 
means westernization. The alternative cultural approach presented here, on the contrary, 
firmly believes that economic development does not imply the adoption of an alien 
culture apparently best fit to promote it. Leaving behind their culture, in order to enjoy 
the delights of development, is not even a option as many studies have shown that the 
only countries that have succeeded in development are those that kept intact the spine of 
their culture, such as the East and South East Asian countries, to which we have referred 
above (Dockès, Rosier, 1988) (Latouche, 1992) (Lê Thàn Khôi, 1992) (Morishima, 
1982) (Han-Yin Chang, 2003) (Jiang Shixue, 1999) and, on another level, Botswana, 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2002) (Carroll and Carroll, 1997) (Stedman ed., 1993).  
 
 Cultivating its culture as a means of development shouldn’t be a synonym of 
inbreeding, though. I do not believe that it is possible for society in underdeveloped 
countries to wrap up in its particularities in order to protect culture from external 
influence. Importing the compass, algebra, paper, tomato, silk, rice, potato, and other 
exotic crops, European culture changed, but have Europeans ceased to be themselves? 
The secret of the success in the once called New Industrialised Countries of the Far 
East, was the combination of openness to the external winds of progress, namely 
technical progress, and the cultivation of tradition. This is the sense in which culture 
matters; as societies always search both to change and to last this combination is 
mutually beneficial because change ensures continuity and tradition works as a 
technique to incorporate change (Perrot, 1994, p 42).  
  
 If external influence worked for Europe and the New Industrialised Countries 
why shouldn’t it work for today’s underdeveloped countries? Why shouldn’t these 
countries smoothly accept western technique, either under the shape of machinery or of 
rationality? According to G. Rist (1994, p 62) the main difference is that Europeans 
adopted foreign technique on a voluntary and individual basis. They could have, indeed, 
ignored those discoveries, but they chose to incorporate them, whereas in the third 
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world modernity was largely imposed, sometimes violently (Amin, 1989, p 160), and 
could not have been a matter of plain individual choice, as the use of this kind of 
technique demanded the existence of networks. Talking on a telephone needs the 
previous connection to a telephone exchange; farming with a tractor needs the existence 
of petrol stations and repair-shops. In the process of incorporating progress, the way it is 
presented to you is at least as important as its nature. 
 
 I would like to stress that this defence of cultural diversity shouldn’t be mistaken 
with radical relativism or the consecration of difference. We should avoid ignoring what 
the other has to say but we also have to make sure that there is still something to say to 
each other. This means, in practical terms, that development studies shouldn’t rely 
exclusively on the use of neither universalistic models nor excessively particularistic 
case studies and monographs. On the first hand the knowledge produced is useless to 
understand the complexity of the development processes because of its lack of realism 
and on the second hand there is a risk of the dissolution of policy oriented knowledge, 
because any information gathered is threatened by the immediate expiration of its 
validity. Thus, between the dominant model, that ignores difference, and the 
particularistic fundamentalism that depoliticises the development process there has to be 
some kind of path. In order to find and to travel along this path I propose to embrace 
pluralism. 
 
 Global development, seen as the spread of the capitalist economical and ethical 
system to all parts, is clearly a derivation of a monist approach. Within the mainstream 
globalization ideology there is, indeed, the belief that there is one best way to reach the 
good life and that, therefore, there is also one best culture to facilitate the process. I 
believe, therefore, that a methodological shift from a monist to a pluralist approach is 
necessary in order to build a new, and more including, development paradigm. We 
would have, then, as many ways of understanding development as the ways people 
envision it. It is probably possible to build some sort of vague universal theory of good 
(Clark, 2002) but it is also enriching to let oneself go across the palette of the 
possibilities. Be it umram (blooming) as with Ibn Khaldun, swadeshi-sarvodaya 
(bettering the social conditions of all) with Gandhi or bamtaare (being well together) 
amongst the Toucouleur people of Senegal and Mauritania (Latouche, 2001). 
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